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NOTE
CRACKING OPEN THE GOLDEN DOOR:
REVISITING U.S. ASYLUM LAW'S RESPONSE TO
CHINA'S ONE-CHILD POLICY
Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to
breathe free .... Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me, I lift my
lamp beside the golden door!'
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has a long and rich history of protecting those

individuals fleeing persecution. The first immigrants came because of
religious persecution; 2 more later came because they were being
persecuted for their political opinions. 3 Congress even extended
protection to those members of a particular social group, 4 to cover "all
the bases for and 5 types of persecution which an imaginative despot
up."

might conjure

Today, faced with the terrible choice between country and family,
many Chinese nationals flee to the United States and apply for political
asylum instead of suffering brutal persecution for violating China's
infamous one-child policy. 6 Since the 1996 amendment 7 to the
Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"),8 the definition of refugee 9 has
1. Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus (1883), reprinted in EMMA LAZARUS: SELECTED
POEMS 58 (John Hollander ed., 2005).
2. See Christy Cutbill McCormick, Comment, Exporting the First Amendment: America's
Response to Religious Persecution Abroad,4 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 283, 317 (1998).
3. See id.
4. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006).
5. Arthur C. Helton, Persecution on Account of Membership in a Social Group as a Basisfor
Refugee Status, 15 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 39, 45 (1983).
6. The one-child policy generally restricts Chinese families from having more than one child
in order to control the country's rapidly growing population. See infra Part II.A.
7. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA"), Pub.
L. No. 104-208, § 601(a)(1), 110 Stat. 3009-689 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)
(2006)).
8. See id. § l(b); Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2000 & Supp.
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been broadened to include those people forced to undergo abortion or
sterilization as a result of violating the one-child policy.10 The
administrative agency tasked with interpreting the 1996 amendment
extended refugee protection to legally married spouses of one-child
policy victims."1 However, the circuit courts have been at odds with each
other regarding this issue12 -- leaving both married and unmarried
partners of direct victims uncertain of whether they will receive asylum
protection.
This Note proposes an amendment extending asylum protection to
both the legally and traditionally married spouses of direct victims of
China's coercive family planning programs. Part II traces the evolution
of the immigration and asylum laws passed by Congress in response to
China's "one-child" policy. Part III then analyzes why the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 should
be amended to explicitly grant asylum to both the direct victims of
China's coercive family planning programs and their spouses. In Part IV,
a proposed amendment is proffered. Finally, Part V confronts the
opposition to such an amendment.
II. CHINA'S ONE-CHILD POLICY AND U.S. ASYLUM LAW'S RESPONSE

A. China's One-ChildPolicy
During the 1950s, the Chinese government sought to increase its
work force by encouraging its citizens to have large families. 13 Chairman
Mao, through his personal mouthpiece, the People's Daily, went so far
as to condemn birth control as "a way of slaughtering the Chinese people
without drawing blood ' 14 and encouraged the people of China to have
2001-2005).
9. The INA defines a refugee as a person outside of his or her country of origin or last
residence who is unable or unwilling to return to that country "because of persecution or a wellfounded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
10. Id. § l101(a)(42)(B).
11. See In re S-L-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 4 (B.I.A. 2006) (en banc).
12.

See infra Part II.C.

13.

See Gerrie Zhang, U.S. Asylum Policy and PopulationControl in the People's Republic of

China, 18 Hous. J. INT'L L. 557, 560 (1996) (noting that this program was one of the major causes

of the explosion in China's population).
14.

STEVEN W. MOSHER, A MOTHER'S ORDEAL: ONE WOMAN'S FIGHT AGAINST CHINA'S

ONE-CHILD POLICY 56-57 (1993); see also Peter Goodspeed, 'Fewer Children-FewerBurdens':
Severe Birth Control Measures Air to Curb Demands of Swelling Population,Still Another 64,000

Babies Born Daily, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 11, 1991, at B 1 (noting that Chairman Mao described birth
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large families with the slogan: "The more babies the more glorious are
their mothers."' 5 But after twenty years, the Chinese government
realized the dire consequences that would ultimately result from such
encouragement. After a perceived failure at reducing birthrates,' 6 the
Chinese government unleashed the now infamous one-child policy' 7 in
an effort to stem the tide. This policy, codified in Chinese law, only
permits married couples to have children. 18 The core of the one-child
policy consists of regulations that restrict "family size, late marriage and
childbearing, and the spacing of children (in cases in which second
children are permitted)."' 9 According to the Chinese government, the
one-child policy has prevented between 250 and 300 million births.2 °
control measures as "bloodless genocide").
15. Xiaorong Li, License to Coerce. Violence Against Women, State Responsibility,and Legal
Failuresin China'sFamily-PlanningProgram,8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 145, 148 (1996).
16. The "later, longer, fewer" program sought to "encourage later marriages, longer intervals
between births, and fewer children." Zhang, supra note 13, at 561. The result after ten years was a
drop in the average fertility rate from 5.9 to 2.9 children per woman. Therese Hesketh et al., The
Effect of China's One-Child Family Policy After 25 Years, 353 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1171, 1172
(2005).
17. See Anne M. Gomez, The New INS Guidelines on Gender Persecution: Their Effect on
Asylum in the UnitedStatesfor Women Fleeing the ForcedSterilization andAbortion Policies of the
People's Republic of China, 21 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 621, 623 (1996). "Chinese leaders
have stressed that the one-child policy is just that-a policy, not a law to be enforced throughout
China without regard to local conditions. Guidelines issued at the central level are to be adapted to
the specific conditions in each province and local area." L.M. Cirando, Note, Informed Choice and
PopulationPolicy: Do the PopulationPolicies of China and the United States Respect and Ensure
Women's Right to Informed Choice?, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 611, 638 n. 117 (1995) (quoting Karen
Hardee-Cleaveland & Judith Banister, Fertility Policy and Implementation in China, 1986-88, 14
POPULATION & DEV. REv. 245, 252 (1988)).
18. See generally Population and Family Planning Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 29, 2001, effective Sept. 1, 2002), (P.R.C.) available at
http://www.unescap.org/esid/psis/population/database/poplaws/law-china/chinapopandfamilyplanni
ng.pdf "Citizens have the right to reproduction as well as the obligation to practise family planning
according to law. Both husbandand wife bear equal responsibility for family planning." Id at art. 17
(emphasis added).
19. Hesketh et al., supra note 16, at 1171. The one-child policy is strictly enforced in urban
areas that contain approximately thirty percent of the population. Id. The most common exception in
which a couple is permitted to have a second child is limited to those couples in rural areas whose
first child was either a girl or disabled-taking into account "both the demands of farm labor and the
traditional preference for boys." U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS

PRACTICES: CHINA 19 (2000). Other exceptions are made for ethnic minorities in remote areas. Id.
Or, in rare cases, such as the May 12, 2008 earthquake that killed approximately 10,000
schoolchildren, affected families are exempted from the one-child policy. Andrew Jacobs, OneChildPolicy Liftedfor Quake Victims 'Parents, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2008, at A8. These exceptions
are not enough-they barely make a dent in the problem. To put it in perspective, even with only
thirty percent of China's population being subject to the brutal one-child policy, it still affects
roughly 390 million people. See infra note 32 and accompanying text. That is almost eighty-three
million more people than the entire United States population. See U.S. Census Bureau, U.S.
POPclock Projection, http://www.census.gov/population/www/popclockus.html (last visited Oct.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2009

3

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 4 [2009], Art. 10
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:1135

Violations of the one-child family policy result in severe
punishments, including forced abortions, 21 imprisonment, 22 fatal
beatings, 23242extreme economic sanctions,24 and even infanticide.25
Alternatively, a woman may be allowed to carry the baby to term, after
which either she or her spouse is forcibly sterilized.26 While the Chinese
government "officially" condemns the use of these brutal methods, the
decentralized nature of enforcement has resulted in the widely publicized
punishment of forcible abortion and sterilization.2 7 Even though
enforcement of the policy does appear to be relaxing in some areas,28 a
23, 2009) (estimating the United States' population to be approximately 307 million).
20. Hesketh et al., supra note 16, at 1172 (finding that since the one-child family policy's
inception the total fertility rate fell from 2.9 to 1.7 children per woman). Ironically, this reduction in
the birthrate is less than that under the more benign "later, longer, fewer" program. See id.
(comparing a drop in the fertility rate of 2.9 children per women under the "later, longer, fewer"
program with a drop in the fertility rate of 1.2 children per women under the one-child policy).
21. See Karen Y. Crabbs, Note, United States Domestic Policies and Chinese Immigrants:
Where ShouldJudges Draw the Line When GrantingPoliticalAsylum?, 7 FLA. J. INT'L L. 249, 26061 (1992) (describing specific instances of forced abortion by the Chinese government).
22. See Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 555-56 (9th Cir. 2004) (describing an instance of
imprisonment).
23. See Hannah Beech, Enemies of the State?, TIME, Sept. 12, 2005, at 58, 61 (describing
instances of villagers being beaten to death).
24. These sanctions can include, inter alia, fines equaling several years' worth of wages or the
loss of a job. U.S. BUREAU OF CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., CHINA: INFORMATION ON
TREATMENT OF RETURNING PEASANTS AND WORKERS WHO VIOLATED THE ONE-CHILD FAMILY
PLANNING POLICY WHILE ABROAD (2002), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/
docid/414ee9014.html [hereinafter TREATMENT OF RETURNING PEASANTS].

25. Harry Wu, Controlling China: The U.S. Congress Should Not Fund State-Mandated
Abortions, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, July 9, 2004, http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/
wu200407090919.asp.
26. "[S]terilization, one of the principal forms of birth control, may also be performed when
parents suffer from alleged 'genetic disorders,' a practice justified by the eugenic objective of
'improving the quality of the population."' Nicole M. Skalla, Note, China's One-Child Policy:
Illegal Children and the Family PlanningLaw, 30 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 329, 336 n.45 (2004) (quoting
Patrick Goodenough, China'sGender ImbalanceStems from 'Family Planning'Policy, CNS NEWS,
Apr. 6, 2001, availableat http://cnsnews.comNiewForeignBureaus.aspPage=//ForeignBureaus\\
archive\\200104\\For200l0406a.html).
27. See Zhang, supra note 13, at 569 (noting reports of forced procedures occurring in
"remote, rural areas"). But see Cleo J. Kung, Supporting the Snakeheads: Human Smuggling from
China and the 1996 Amendment to the U.S. Statutory Definition of "Refugee", 90 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1271, 1297 (2000) (arguing that forced abortions and sterilizations are the exception
to the policy and that such procedures are perpetrated by corrupt local officials rather than
attributable to China's national policy).
28. See Hesketh et al., supra note 16, at 1171; accord U.S. Dep't of State, Background Note:
China (2009), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/18902.htm (lasted visited Oct. 23, 2009) [hereinafter
Background Note: China] (noting that there may be an "allowance for a second child under certain
circumstances, especially in rural areas"). But see TREATMENT OF RETURNING PEASANTS, supra
note 24 ("[T]here was some evidence that the Chinese government was relaxing this policy. For
example, in most major cities, parents with no siblings may have two children.").
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retired China analyst with the United States Census Bureau noted that
"it's not policy [that is relaxing], it's weakness in the administrative
structure., 29 Despite any official condemnation, violations of the policy
continue to be severely punished.3 ° Currently, the Chinese government
has no intention of discontinuing the one-child policy, 31 as it is
struggling to meet its goal of keeping the population below 1.4 billion by
2010.32

B. The Application of the IRIRA by the Board of Immigration Appeals
and Circuit Courts
As is the case with most complex discussions, it helps to get the lay
of the land before beginning. This section details the convoluted and
tortuous evolution of the application over the past thirteen years.
1. The IIRIRA
Congress's abhorrence of the draconian one-child family policy
resulted in the passage of the IIRIRA.3 In particular, section 601(a) of
the IIRIRA amended the definition of "refugee" in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101 (a)(42) by adding,
For purposes of determinations under this Act, a person who has been
forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization, or
who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a
procedure or for other resistance to a coercive population control
program, shall be deemed to have been persecuted on account of
political opinion, and a person who has a well founded fear that he or
she will be forced to undergo such a procedure or subject to
persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance shall be deemed to

29. TREATMENT OF RETURNING PEASANTS, supra note 24.
30. See Jim Abrams, Abuse of One-ChildProgram Decried,TORONTO STAR, Dec. 19, 2004,
at B9. In one county in China, it is alleged that at least seven thousand people were forced to
undergo sterilizations between March and July 2005. See Beech, supra note 23, at 61.
31. Jim Yardley, China Says One-ChildPolicy Will Stay for at Least Another Decade, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 11, 2008, at AI0 ("China's top population official said the country's one-child-percouple family planning policy would not change for at least another decade.").
32. The State Department estimates the official number to be "just over 1.3 billion" with "an
estimated growth rate of about 0.6%," and currently projects that "the population will peak at
around 1.6 billion by 2050." Background Note: China, supra note 28.
33. Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., & 28 U.S.C.).
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have •a• 34well founded fear of persecution on account of political
opinion.
This formed the cornerstone of today's immigration and asylum
policy for Chinese asylum seekers. It has also turned into a touchstone
for a serious divide among the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA")
and various circuit courts of appeals.
2. The Board of Immigrations Appeals Interprets the IIRIRA
Before discussing the BIA's interpretation of section 601(a), it is
necessary to briefly explain the BIA's position in the adjudicative
hierarchy. The BIA stands as the "highest administrative body [in the
United States] for interpreting and applying immigration laws., 35 Its
primary function is to guide immigration judges ("Us") by "correcting
their errors and publishing decisions that serve as legal precedents. 36
Thus, it serves as an appellate body which reviews the IJs' decisions. But
the INA did not create the BIA as an appellate body. Instead, it delegated
appellate authority to the United States Attorney General, who in turn
has delegated that authority to the immigration courts and the BIA. 37 As
such, all BIA decisions are subject to the Attorney General's discretion
and may be modified or overruled at any point 38 because the Attorney
General's decisions on "all questions of law" relating to immigration and
naturalization are "controlling." 39 In addition to this review by the
Attorney General, the BIA's decisions are subject to limited judicial
review 40 and are entitled to Chevron41 deference for issues of statutory
interpretation.42
The BIA first addressed the application of section 601 (a) in In re CY-Z-. 43 There, a Chinese national sought asylum, alleging persecution on
account of his opposition to China's family planning policies. 44 After
giving birth to the couple's first child, the asylum seeker's wife
34. Id. § 601(a)(l).
35. Board of Immigration Appeals, http://www.justice.gov/eoirbiainfo.htm (last visited Oct.
23, 2009).
36. Evelyn H. Cruz, Double the Injustice, Twice the Harm: The Impact of the Board of
Immigration Appeals's Summary Affirmance Procedures, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 481, 499
(2005).
37. See CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 3.03 (2009).

38. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (2009).
39. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(l) (2006).
40. See GORDON ET AL., supranote 37, § 104.05.

41. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1983).
42. The court applied the Chevron deference test. See id. at 843.
43. 21 1. & N. Dec. 915 (B.I.A. 1997).
44. Id. at915-16.
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underwent forced insertion of an intrauterine device ("IUD").45 Despite
being ordered to undergo a forced abortion after removing the IUD and
becoming pregnant, the woman went into hiding and eventually gave
birth to her second child.46 After being threatened with the destruction of
his home, the applicant managed to have the punishment lowered to a
fine instead.4 7 However, upon the birth of a third child, the asylum
seeker's wife was forcibly sterilized.4 8
The BIA held that the asylum seeker was eligible "for asylum by
virtue of his wife's forced sterilization. ' 49 The reasoning seemed to rely
completely on an "agreement of the parties that forced sterilization of
one spouse on account of a ground protected under the Act is an act of
persecution against the other spouse." 50 Yet the BIA neither referenced
the statutory language of section 601(a) on which it based its decision,
nor did it provide an explicit rationale for adopting this view. Board
Member Rosenberg's concurrence in C-Y-Z- did, however, provide a
more reasoned explanation, 51 arguing that eligibility for asylum should
be granted by imputing the wife's persecution to her husband.5 2 Yet, this
concurrence also failed to identify the statutory language of section
601(a) upon which its reasoning was based.
3. The Ninth Circuit Denies the BIA's Interpretation
The first major case after C-Y-Z- to address the issue of an
applicant's marital status under the IIRIRA was Ma v. Ashcroftf 3 In this
case, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the BIA's denial of an asylum claim by
Ma, a husband alleging persecution based on his wife's forced
abortion. 4 His wife underwent the procedure upon coming out of hiding
after the government seized Ma's father and threatened his life.55
The issue of marital status arose because Ma's age prevented him

45. Id. at 916.
46. Id.
47.

Id.

48. Id.
49. Id.at 918.
50. Id.at 919.
51. See id. at 920 ("My agreement is based not only on the specific language of the statute as
amended and the positions of the parties. It also is based on the relevant precedent decisions of this
Board, the Federal courts, and the Supreme Court, which have construed the elements contained in
the refugee definition and interpreted the proper exercise of discretion in asylum cases.")
(Rosenberg, Board Member, concurring).
52. See id.
at 926-27.
53. 361 F.3d 553 (9th Cir. 2004).
54. Id.at 556.
55. Id. at 555-56.
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from entering into a "legal" marriage. 56 In response, he and his wife
were married in a "traditional" ceremony. 7 But the BIA refused to
extend the C-Y-Z- rule of spousal asylum protection to a husband whose
marriage was not officially recognized.58 According to the BIA, proof of
a legal marriage was required for an applicant to qualify as "the spouse
59
of the person who was allegedly forced to have an abortion.,
Ironically, the BIA found no link between Ma's inability to legally marry
and China's one-child policy, despite the fact that "the prohibition
against underage marriages is 'an integral part' of China's coercive
60
population control program.,
While the BIA viewed Ma's legal marital status as dispositive, the
Ninth Circuit disagreed. 6 1 The court found the BIA's decision, which
drew a distinction between legally and traditionally married couples,
disregarded the congressional intent behind section 601(a) and would
lead to "absurd and wholly unacceptable results. 62 Thus, the court
declared that it would not afford deference63 to the BIA's decision.64
56. Id. at 555. For the purposes of this Note, "legal" marriages refer to those marriages
officially recognized by the Chinese government. Conversely, "traditional" marriages refer to those
couples that are joined by traditional or religious marriage ceremonies, but who are not recognized
as married by the Chinese government. Moreover, these couples are not recognized as married only
because they do not meet the age requirement to be married in the eyes of the Chinese government.
See, e.g., id (stating that the Chinese government prohibits couples "from entering into a legally
recognized marriage until [the couple is] twenty-two" years old). But see id.at 555 n.3 (noting that
the legal age for women to marry in the asylum seeker's village is only twenty). Accord BUREAU OF
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CHINA: PROFILE OF ASYLUM
CLAIMS
AND
COUNTRY
CONDITIONS
23
(1998),
available
at
http:/l

www.asylumlaw.org/docs/showDocument.cfm?documentlD=147 [hereinafter PROFILE OF ASYLUM
CLAIMS] ("The minimum age for marriage in China is 22 for males and 20 for females. In some
localities the ages are set higher. Whatever the regulated marriage age, however, couples normally
are encouraged-or pressed-to delay pregnancies ... .
57. Ma, 361 F.3d at 555.
58. See id at 554, 558.
59. Id. at 557.
60. Id. at 559. In effect, the coercive family planning policies create the strict age
requirements for marriage, and thus, having children. In turn, this creates a situation that forces
young couples to violate those policies if they want to start a family. See id at 559-61.
61. See id. at 558-59.
62. Id. at 559.
63. The court applied the Chevron deference test. See id. at 558; see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (describing the high level of deference
afforded administrative decisions). Chevron deference involves a two-step process. First, a court
asks whether the language of the statute addresses the specific issue in question. If so, the particular
language of the statute controls the determination of that issue. See id. at 842-43. But if not, then the
second step requires that a court limit its examination to the reasonableness of the agency's
interpretation of the statute. See id.at 843 ("[Tlhe question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute."); John W. Guendelsberger, Judicial
Deference to Agency Decisions in Removal Proceedings in Light of INS v. Ventura, 18 GEO.
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According to the court, because the legislative intent of section 601(a)
was to provide protection to couples who have been persecuted on
account of an "unauthorized" pregnancy, 65 and because China's ban on

"underage" marriage formed an "integral part" of its one-child policy, 66

husbands married in traditional ceremonies deserve as much protection
as those officially married.67 Were it to adopt the BIA's holding, the
court noted, it would result in the break up of a family, which "is at odds
not only with [section 601(a)], but also with significant parts of our
overall immigration policy.

'68

Consequently, the Ninth Circuit held that

the protections of section 601(a) apply to both husbands whose
marriages are recognized by Chinese authorities as well as those
husbands whose marriages would be legally recognized but for China's
one-child policy.

69

4. Three Years of Twists and Turns
By and large, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Ma did not herald the
beginning of a trend towards interpreting section 601(a) to extend
refugee status to legally or traditionally married spouses.7 ° In fact, only
one other circuit court to have this issue before it over the following
three years followed this interpretation.7 1 However, several circuits did
follow the BIA's interpretation in C-Y-Z- and S-L-L-.72 In addition to this
unity among the circuits, there were, however, a few notable cases which
raised issues that would have a far-reaching effect on the interpretation
of section 601(a).

IMMIGR. L.J. 605, 618 (2004) ("[T]he court is limited to assessing whether the agency's
interpretation of the statute is reasonable."). Most importantly, a court may not impose its own
interpretation of the statute in place of that of the agency. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
64. See Ma, 361 F.3d at 558-59 (explaining the usual level of deference afforded BIA
decisions by the courts, and why this decision did not warrant such deference).
65. Id.at 559 (citing H.R. REP. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 174 (1996)).
66. Id. at 559-60 (citing various sources for the notion that the policy against early marriages
is predicated upon preventing and terminating young pregnancies and births).
67. Seeid.at561.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. For the purpose of consistency and clarity in this Note, the term "spouse" only refers to
legally married or traditionally married individuals. Similarly, the term "unmarried partner" refers to
individuals who are simply dating or engaged.
71. See Zhang v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 993, 1001 (7th Cir. 2006).
72. See, e.g., Chen Lin-Jian v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 182, 188 (4th Cir. 2007); Hong Zhang Cao
v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 657, 660 (8th Cir. 2006); Tai v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1, 4 (lst Cir. 2005); cf
Zhang v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 531, 532 (5th Cir. 2004) (following C-Y-Z- in holding that a boyfriend
was ineligible for asylum under § 601(a), but noting that since there was no traditional marriage the
court "need not reach the issued raised in Ma").
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For example, shortly after Ma was decided in 2004, the issue of
marital status arose in the Third Circuit during the case of Chen v.
Ashcroft.73 There, the asylum seeker claimed he was eligible for asylum
due to his fiancee's forced abortion by Chinese authorities. 74 He
reasoned that C-Y-Z-'s spousal eligibility rule should extend to him
because, although he and his fiancee never married, they would have
married if Chinese law allowed marriages for those his age.75 In
particular, the asylum seeker argued that the BIA's interpretation of
section 601(a) is "arbitrary, capricious, and irrational" and must be
rejected.76 While the IJ found Chen to have qualified for asylum because
the facts of his case fell "by analogy" within the Board's rule in C-Y-Zextending eligibility to a spouse,77 the BIA reversed on the grounds that
the agency did not extend C-Y-Z- in prior decisions to the unmarried
partners of forced abortion victims. 78 The Third Circuit upheld this
decision,
adopting a view contrary to the Ninth Circuit's decision in
9
Ma.

7

Similarly, the Third Circuit departed from the Ninth Circuit's
reasoning in that it did afford deference to the BIA's decision. 80 But as in
Ma, the Chen court limited its review to the distinction between married
and unmarried couples and declined to assess whether the underlying CY-Z- interpretation of section 601(a) was, in fact, permissible. 8 1 In
particular, the court held that the BIA's decision not to extend C-Y-Zwas reasonable in light of the agency's "crushing caseload, 82 its need to
avoid problems of proof,83 and the 1000-person-per-year cap imposed on
asylum grants under the language of section 601(a).84 The court

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

381 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2004).
Id. at 222.
Id. At the time in question, Chen was nineteen, and his fiancee was eighteen. Id. at 223.
Id. at 224.
Id. at 223.

78.

Id.

79. See id. at 235. "[T]he BIA's interpretation, which contributes to efficient administration
and avoids difficult and problematic factual inquiries, is reasonable." Id.at 222. The Fifth Circuit
similarly upheld the BIA's determination that the spousal rule did not extend to fianc~s, adopting, in
its entirety, the reasoning of the Third Circuit in Chen. See Zhang v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 531, 532
(5th Cir. 2004).
80.

Chen, 381 F.3d at 227.

81. Id. ("[I]f C-Y-Z-'s interpretation is permissible (and we assume for the sake of argument
that it is), the distinction that the BIA has drawn between married and unmarried couples satisfies
step two of Chevron.").
82. Id. at 228 (quoting Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 235 (3d Cir. 2003)).
83. Id.(noting the difficulty implicit in proving paternity when a male applicant claims to
have fathered an illegitimate child who was forcibly aborted).
84. Cf id.
at 229 (emphasizing the limited number of spots permitted by Congress for asylum
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ultimately determined that Chevron deference was appropriate because
"it would seem absurd to characterize reliance on marital status.. . as
arbitrary and capricious.

'85

The court went on to hold that its rule was

reasonable despite excluding those who wanted a legal marriage but
86
were prevented from doing so because of China's age requirements.
In 2005, it was the Second Circuit's turn to tackle the issue of
extending refugee status to married or unmarried spouses. In Lin v. U.S.
Department of Justice (Lin /),87 the claims of three Chinese nationals
who sought asylum under section 601(a) by virtue of their unmarried
partners' forced abortions were consolidated.88 Similar to the Third
Circuit's decision, the IJ here denied each application, finding that C-YZ-'s holding does not apply to a victim's boyfriend or fianc6. 89 After the
BIA summarily affirmed each decision, 90 petitioners all appealed to the
Second Circuit. 91 Here, unlike in Ma and Chen, the Court did address the
underlying interpretation of C-Y-Z-. Because the BIA failed to provide
reasoning for extending section 601(a) to a victim's spouse when it
decided C-Y-Z-, it could not logically determine whether a victim's
unmarried partner could be granted such protection.9 2 As a result, the
court remanded the petitions to the BIA, ordering it to explain its
reasoning in C-Y-Z- and to clarify whether section 601(a) extends to a
93
victim's unmarried partner as well as her spouse.
On remand, in the case of S-L-L-, 94 the BIA reaffirmed C-Y-Z- as
applied to legal spouses but declined to extend per se eligibility to a
victim's unmarried partner. 95 The BIA reasoned that the underlying
purpose of section 601(a) is to protect the victim and the spouse as a
claims). At the time Chen was decided, a 1000 person per year cap existed under the IIRIRA. This
was repealed in 2005. Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice (Lin 1), 416 F.3d 184, 188 n.l (2d Cir. 2005).
85. Chen, 381 F.3d at 227 n.6.
86. Id. at 229-30. The court noted that even in the United States, every state has the right to
regulate the age at which couples can legally marry, and that China's age limit does not "necessarily
amount[] to persecution." Id. at 230.
87. 416 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2005).
88. Id.at 188 (detailing the various asylum claims).
89. See id. (summarizing the IJ's decision restricting C-Y-Z-'s holding to legal spouse).
90. See id.
at 189.
91. Seeid at188.
92. Id. at 187 (remanding to BIA to clarify
C-Y-Z- and retaining jurisdiction to rehear
petitions).
93. Id.at 192; see also Megan C. Dempsey, Note, A Misplaced Bright-Line Rule: Coercive
Population Control in China and Asylum for Unmarried Partners, 92 IOWA L. REv. 213, 234-35

(2006) (noting that the court could not evaluate C-Y-Z-'s reasonableness because BIA did not
articulate a rationale).
94. In re S-L-L-, 24 1.& N. Dec. 1 (B.I.A.2006) (en banc).
95. See id. at 4.
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marital unit. 96 Yet, it went on to hold that this protection only extends to
a victim's legal spouse and that unmarried partners must claim asylum
under section 601(a)'s "other resistance" clause.97
Finally, in 2007, the Eleventh Circuit in Yi Qiang Yang v. United
States Attorney General,98 extended the Third Circuit's decision in Chen
and the BIA's decision in S-L-L- when it determined that asylum
applicants-married in traditional ceremonies-did not qualify as
refugees under section 601(a) simply based upon their spouse's forced
abortion or sterilization.99 Yang claimed that he and his wife were
married in a traditional ceremony because they were prevented from
officially marrying due to the Chinese government's age restrictions for
marriage. °0 Shortly after that traditional marriage ceremony occurred,
the couple conceived a child.'0 1 Since the marriage was illegal, the
Chinese government forced Yang's wife to have an abortion upon
02
learning of the pregnancy.

The BIA-affirming the IJ's decision-dismissed Yang's appeal by
stating that underage couples are not legally married under Chinese law
and only individuals in legal marriages were spouses under the rationale
of C-Y-Z-.10 3 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, determining the BIA's
decision in S-L-L- reasonably interpreted the refugee statute by denying
protection to the unmarried fathers of aborted children. 10 4 The court
stated that legal marriage reflected a commitment other relationships did
not.10 5 In addition, the court found that refugee protection under section
601(a) should only be extended to legally married husbands, as legally
married husbands have a more important role in deciding with their
wives whether to conceive a child regardless of any laws against it.'0 6 It
96. Id.at 6 ("Congress intended [section 601(a)] to protect both spouses when the government
has forced a married couple opposed to an abortion to submit to [a forced abortion].").
97. Id. at 10 (explaining the other resistance clause and how the spouse whose partner was the
victim of a forced abortion or sterilization may receive protection under it).
98. 494 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir. 2007).

99. Compare Yi Qiang Yang v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 494 F.3d 1311, 1317 (1lth Cir. 2007)
(stating illegally married spouses do not per se qualify for section 601 refugee status) with Chen v.
Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 232 (3d Cir. 2004) (stating it was reasonable to limit C-Y-Z- protection to
spouses), and S-L-L-, 24 1. & N. Dec. at 9 (stating section 601 asylum protections do not extend to
the boyfriends and fianc6s of individuals submitted to a forced abortion or sterilization).
100. Yi Qiang Yang, 494 F.3dat 1313.
101.

102.
103.
104.
105.
intimate
106.

Id.

Id.
Id.at 1315.
Id.at 1317.
See id (stating "legal marriage reflects a sanctity and long term commitment" which other
relationships do not).
Id.
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also noted that the existence of a legal marriage allowed courts to make
practical presumptions, including the paternity of the child and
impairment of both spouses' reproductive opportunities, based on one
spouse's forced abortion or sterilization.10 7 The court recognized its
decision differed from two circuits that extended refugee status to
traditionally married spouses,108 but determined that these other two
circuit decisions had little persuasive value in light of S-L-L-.' 0 9
5. The Second Circuit Denies Per Se Refugee Status to All Spouses
After the BIA's decision in S-L-L-, the Second Circuit surprised
many by ordering sua sponte an en banc rehearing to determine two
issues: (1) whether section 601(a) is ambiguous, thus requiring courts to
defer to the BIA's ruling under Chevron; and (2) whether the BIA
reasonably construed section 601(a) to offer per se asylum to a victim's
legally married spouse but not to an unmarried partner. 1 0 The court held
that section 601(a) is not ambiguous, and as a result, the BIA
impermissibly construed the statute. 11' The court found that, in choosing
to use the words, "person," "undergo," "he," and "she" to describe the
class that section 601(a) protects, Congress intended to strictly limit
protection to persons, not couples.1 2 The court further noted that section
601(a) is just an exception to the general rule that in order to obtain
asylum, applicants must describe a personal ordeal amounting to
impermissible persecution.113
As a result, not only did the Second Circuit find that section 601(a)
does not apply to a victim's common law spouse, fiancd, or boyfriend, it
also abrogated C-Y-Z- in holding that even a victim's legal spouse lacks
automatic protection under the provision. 1 4 Thus, under the Lin II
court's approach, only direct victims of coercive family-planning

107.

Id. (citing In re S-L-L-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 1, 9 (B.I.A. 2006)).

108. See Zhang v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 993, 999 (7th Cir. 2006); Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553,
559 (9th Cir. 2004).
109. Yi Qiang Yang, 494 F.3d at 1318.
110. Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice (Lin 11), 494 F.3d 296, 299-300 (2d Cir. 2007); see
also Mark Hamblett, En Banc Panel: No Per Se Asylum for Spouses of Persecuted Chinese, N.Y.

L.J., July 17, 2007, at 1 (noting that a sua sponte ordering of an en banc rehearing is unusual).
11. Lin II, 494 F.3d at 306.
112. Id. at 306 (finding that these clauses contemplate procedures performed on victim's own
body).
113. Id. at 306-07 (stating that section 601(a) does not change the refugee definition requiring
personally-experienced persecution). But see id. at 324 (Katzmann, J., concurring) (arguing that the
effect on a victim's spouse may amount to personal persecution).
114. See id. at 305-06; see also Hamblett, supra note 110 (noting how the Second Circuit's
ruling unraveled ten years of precedent).
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5
policies are considered per se refugees under section 601(a). 1

6. The Attorney General Overrules the BIA
In 2008, the United States Attorney General ("Attorney General")
overruled the BIA's decisions in C-Y-Z- and S-L-L- in the case of In re JS-. 116 There, it was held that refugee protection under section 60 1(a) was
not automatically extended to legally and traditionally married spouses
of individuals subjected to a forced sterilization or abortion." 7 The
asylum seeker, Shi, argued that he should be granted refugee status
under section 601(a) because the Chinese government had forced his
wife to be fitted with an IUD that prevented the couple from having a
second child." 8 The IJ denied Shi's application, finding that "[t]he
forcible insertion of an intrauterine
device is not tantamount to
9
sterilization nor to abortion.""
After the BIA affirmed the IJ's decision, Shi appealed his case to
the Third Circuit. 120 But before the case reached the Third Circuit panel,
the Second Circuit rendered its decision in Lin J.121 In order to "provide
a final administrative ruling on a statutory question that has divided the
Federal courts of appeals," the Attorney General directed the BIA to
refer to him the BIA's decision in J-S- for review. 122 The Third Circuit,
in turn, dismissed Shi's appeal
following receipt of the Attorney
23
General's certification order. 1
The Attorney General acknowledged that the BIA's decisions in
C-Y-Z- and S-L-L- were long-standing precedent that Congress and the
courts had relied upon and were "undeniably important," but that "it
does not prevent the Department of Justice from reversing administrative
decisions when there is good reason for doing so.",1 24 The Attorney
General went on to declare that his reasoning was that the BIA's
interpretation of section 601 (a) was "unsupported by the provision's text,

115. SeeLinII,494 F.3d at 308.
116. 24 I. & N. Dec. 520, 520 (Att'y Gen. 2008).
117. See id. at 521 (overruling the BIA's decisions in C-Y-Z- and S-L-L- "to the extent those
cases hold that the spouse of a person who has been physically subjected to a forced abortion or
sterilization procedure is per se entitled to refugee status under section 601(a) of IIRIRA").
118. Id. at524.

119. Id. at525.
120. Id.

121. Id. at 525-26 (citing Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice (Lin 11), 494 F.3d 296, 300 (2d
Cir. 2007)).

122. Id.at 521. The Attorney General ordered this review of the BIA's decision pursuant to
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i) (2006). Id.
123. Id.at 526.
124. Id.at 532.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol37/iss4/10

14

Masson: Cracking Open the Golden Door: Revisiting U.S. Asylum Law's Respo
U. S. ASYLUM LA WAND CHINA 'S ONE-CHILD POLICY

2009]

structure, history, and purpose." 125 When looking at the actual language
of section 601(a), the Attorney General found its ordinary or natural
meaning clearly limits per se refugee status to those individuals
personally forced to submit to abortion or sterilization.' 26 This textual
analysis was "bolstered by reading section 601(a) in harmony with other
provisions of the [INA] conferring refugee status."'' 27 The Attorney
General found it difficult to reconcile the per se rule of spousal eligibility
with both the INA's express provision requiring a spouse seeking
derivative asylum to actually accompany the primary applicant into the
United States and its general requirement that every
applicant must
28
establish his or her own eligibility for asylum relief.
In addition to this textual and structural analysis, the Attorney
General claimed that the legislative history of section 601(a) does not
expressly address whether the spouses of individuals forced to undergo
an abortion or sterilization procedure are entitled to per se refugee
status.129 What is most interesting, and confusing, was that he made this
claim while at the same time recognizing that the purpose of section
601(a) was to "expand" asylum relief to victims of coercive family
planning policies. 30 The Attorney General went on to conclude that his
decision did not foreclose the possibility of spouses of those personally
subjected to a forced abortion or
sterilization to establish eligibility for
3
asylum on a case-by-case basis.1 '
C. The "Current" State of Section 601(a)
With the Second Circuit's decision in Lin II and the Attorney
General's decision in J-S-, there has been a growing trend among the
circuit courts of appeals to follow suit. As it stands now, the Second,
Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh circuits have followed J-S- in
determining that only direct victims of forced abortion or sterilization are
eligible for per se refugee status. 32 The First, Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
Id. at 529.
Id.at 530.
Id. (citing

INA

§ 208(b)(1)(B)(i),

8 U.S.C.

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i)

(2006);

INA

§ 208(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A) (2006)).

129.
130.

Id. at538.
Id. at 541.

131.

Id.

132. See, e.g., Shou Wei Jin v. Holder, 572 F.3d 392, 395-96 (7th Cir. 2009); Zhao Yang Shi v.
Holder, No. 08-5275-ag, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 11872, at *2 (2d Cir. Jun. 3, 2009); Yu v. Attorney
Gen., 568 F.3d 1328, 1334 (11th Cir. 2009); Zhao v. Holder, 569 F.3d 238, 245-46 (6th Cir. 2009);
Lin-Zheng v. Attorney Gen., 557 F.3d 147, 157 (3d Cir. 2009); accord Cai Gui Chen v. Filip, 308
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circuits retain the interpretation of section 601(a) that extends refugee
protection to the spouses of direct victims. 33 However, it should be
noted that none of these circuits have revisited this issue since J-S- was
decided. 134 Thus, it stands to reason that because the former group of
circuits performed an analysis of the actual text of section 601(a) and
followed the controlling decision of J-S-, that interpretation will be
adopted by the latter group of circuits when the issue presents itself
before those courts.13 5 Notably, the only other circuit to have this
particular issue before it simply dispatched the case on the matter of
credibility.' 36 As a result of this shift in the interpretation regarding
spousal eligibility under section 601(a), the intention of Congress in
passing the IIRIRA has been thwarted.

III. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT BEHIND THE IIRIRA
A. The IIRIRA Was Meant to Protect Those Who Have Suffered
Persecution
The IIRIRA was passed because Congress understood that China's
coercive family planning programs are a terrible violation of human
rights.1 37 The legislative history behind the IIRIRA, including debates
Fed. App'x. 785, 788 (5th Cir. 2009) (remanding to the BIA with the instruction to "take into
consideration" the decision in J-S-).
133. See, e.g., Weixiong Zhu v. Mukasey, 261 Fed. App'x. 43, 43 (9th Cir. 2007); Lin-Jian v.
Gonzales, 489 F.3d 182, 188 (4th Cir. 2007); Hong Zhang Cao v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 657, 660 (8th
Cir. 2006); Zeng v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 26, 28 (1st Cir. 2006).
134. Compare supra note 133 (indicating that the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth circuit cases
were decided before 2008) with J-S-, 24 1. & N. Dec. at 520.
135. See, e.g., Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 107 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (expressing concern that putting policy before text would improperly
shape "judicial interpretation of statutes").
136. See, e.g., Xunsheng Liv. Mukasey, 302 Fed. App'x. 839, 842 (10th Cir. 2008).
137. Forced Abortion and Sterilization in China: The View from the Inside: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Int ' Operations and Human Rights of the H. Comm. on Int'l Relations, 105th Cong.
10
(1998),
available
at
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa49740.000/
hfa49740_0.htm#1 1 [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Rep. Lantos, Member, House Subcomm. on
International Operations and Human Rights) ("There are few crimes against human beings which
are more horrendous, more despicable, more outrageous than the practice of forced abortion and
forced sterilization. Such brutal violations of human rights must be condemned across the political
spectrum .. "); 142 CONG. REc. 6008 (1996) (statement of Rep. Smith) ("[Olne of the most
gruesome human rights violations in the history of the world [is] forced abortion."); 141 CONG.
REc. 19,742 (1995) (statement of Rep. Ros-Lehtinen) ("[W]e know that [forced abortions] violate
every known standard of human rights since God made man."); 141 CONG. REC. 19,741 (1995)
(statement of Rep. Woolsey) ("I believe that the time has come to quit coddling the tyrants in
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over China's program, does not reveal an intention to limit asylum
protection to direct victims only. Rather, Congress's intention was to
remedy the violation of a person's basic right to procreate, which is
recognized in both U.S. law 138 and international law. 139 The father of a
forcibly aborted child has had his basic right to procreate violated as
much as the mother of a forcibly aborted child. 140 As was noted by the
Ninth Circuit, the mother's suffering,4 due to a forced abortion or
sterilization, is "imputed" to the father.' '
Concurrently, as the age limits on marriage are a key element of
China's one-child policy, 14 ' asylum should not be denied to those who
would have otherwise qualified except for the fact that they were unable
143
to marry under the very rules from which they are seeking asylum.
Beijing. It is time to say to the Chinese Government that.., forced abortions... [are] not
tolerable."); 141 CONG. REC. 19,739 (1995) (statement of Rep. Wolf) ("China's strict one-child-perfamily policy has resulted in gross violations of human rights, including forced abortion and
sterilization."); 141 CONG. REc. 19,737 (1995) (statement of Rep. Lantos) ("The Chinese
Government enforces sickening and draconian birth control policies of forced sterilization and
forced abortions."); 140 CONG. REC. 464 (1994) (statement of Sen. Helms) (comparing China's onechild family policy to the actions of Nazi Germany under Hitler).
138. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (finding that the
right to procreate is "one of the basic civil rights of man"); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (noting that the right to have children is a special liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 463 (1985)
(commenting that eugenic marriage and sterilization laws "extinguished for the retarded.., the right
to marry and procreate."); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 472 n.7 (1977) ("[T]he right of procreation
without state interference has long been recognized as 'one of the basic civil rights of
man ... fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race."' (quoting Skinner, 316 U.S. at
541)).
139. See ln re C-Y-Z-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 915, 921 n.2 (B.I.A. 1997) (Rosenberg, Board Member,
concurring) (noting that the fundamental right to procreate is reflected in international human rights
standards such as the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102). The concurring
opinion from Board Member Rosenberg listed several international sources that proclaim basic civil
rights, including the right to procreate. See id. (citing Universal Declaration of Human Rights art.
16(1), G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, 74, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doe. A/810 (Dec. 12,
1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (approved by the United States Senate on Apr. 2, 1992)).
140. See Qu v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1195, 1202 & n.8 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that forcible
abortion, like sterilization, should be viewed as continuing persecution because of the "irremediable
and ongoing suffering of being permanently denied the existence of a son or daughter").
141. See Xue Yun Zhang v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 1239, 1245-46 (9th Cir. 2005).
142. See Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 559-60 (9th Cir. 2004) ("The record in this case
conclusively shows, and this Circuit has already held, that the prohibition against underage
marriages is 'an integral part' of China's coercive population control program.") (citing Hearing,
supra note 137, at 24-26) (statement of Zhou Shiu Yon, victim of Chinese population control
program) (testifying that she was targeted for forced abortion procedures because at nineteen years
of age, she was unable to legally marry her boyfriend)).
143. See Ma, 361 F.3d at 559 ("The BIA's refusal to grant asylum to an individual who cannot
register his marriage with the Chinese government on account of a law promulgated as part of its
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The argument that China's age limits on marriage are acceptable because
other countries have younger age limits on marriage misses the point
completely. 144 The reasons behind the age limits on marriage illuminate
the distinction. The general reason for age limits on marriage is to
protect young children from being thrown into marriage situations before
they are physically and mentally ready. 145 China's marriage restrictions
have nothing to do with protecting children; rather, the goal of these
restrictions is to assist in the enforcement of China's one-child family
policy.146

The legislative history behind section 601(a) shows that "couples
with unauthorized children" were meant to be eligible. 147 The Lin II
court and the Attorney General in J-S- contended that Congress would
have included the word spouse had it intended to grant them asylum
eligibility. 148 But, similarly, if Congress had wanted to restrict the statute
to direct victims only, the congressional record would have indicated as
such. In the concurrence of Lin 11, the judges argued that there is an
explicit prohibition of asylum eligibility in section 601 (a) for those "who
ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of
any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.', 149 The implication here is
that Congress intentionally excluded these individuals as the only
individuals they believed should not be granted asylum eligibility.
When the issue was discussed in Congress, the emphasis was on
doing something for more than just direct victims of China's one-child
policy. 150 In earlier congressional discussions on extending asylum
coercive population control policy.., contravenes the [IIRIRA] and leads to absurd and wholly
unacceptable results.").
144. See Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221,230 (3d Cir. 2004).
145. See id. at 230 n.12 (citing Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for
Marriage and Registration of Marriages, G.A. Res. 1763A(xvii), art. 2, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess.,
Supp. No. 17, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/17/1763 (Nov. 7, 1962)); Moe v. Dinkins, 669 F.2d 67, 68
(2d Cir. 1982) (noting that age restrictions on marriage "prevent[] unstable marriages among those
lacking the capacity to act in their own best interests").
146. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
147. H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, pt. 1, at 174 (1996). Congress explicitly stated that it intended to
overrule "several decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals." Id. at 173-74. Several cases were
specified, including Matter of G-, 20 1. & N. Dec. 764 (B.I.A. 1993). There the applicant was the
spouse of a woman who, after giving birth to their second child, was fined by the Chinese
government while his wife was ordered to report for sterilization. Matter of G-, 20 I. & N. Dec. at
774.
148. Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice (Lin I1), 494 F.3d 296, 307 (2d Cir. 2007);
In re J-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 520, 532-33 (Att'y Gen. 2008).
149. Lin 11, 494 F.3d at 318 (Katzmann, Sotomayor, Straub & Pooler, JJ., concurring).
150. H.R. REp. No. 104469, pt. 1, at 174 ("The United States should not deny protection to
persons subjected to such treatment."); 135 CONG. REc. 26,927 (1989) (statement of Rep. Smith)
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protection to victims of China's coercive family planning programs, the
envisioned solution was to help those affected by the population control
program and not just the direct victims of forced abortion or
sterilization.' sl Yet the only explicit mention to a class beyond direct
victims was made specifically to couples. 1 52 In light of this, it follows
that Congress certainly intended to protect married couples who
attempted to procreate but could not because of China's one-child
policy. Moreover, "the early marriage prohibition is inextricably linked
to the restrictions on childbirth."'1 53 Therefore, couples who were only
married in a traditional ceremony because the one-child policy's limits
on marriage denied them an official marriage also fall within the class of
people intended to be protected under section 601(a). Because of this, it
makes sense that both officially and traditionally married spouses should
("[T]his outrageous persecution of the family cries out for compassion ....Asylum for those
fleeing this tyranny ...is the minimum that we can provide."); 135 CONG. REc. 26,924 (1989)
(statement of Rep. Morrison) ("Let me say that there is no disagreement of which I am aware on the
goal of allowing refugee or asylum status to Chinese nationals who are fleeing forced abortions or
forced sterilization .... [P]eople who are faced with that kind of persecution are entitled to refugee
or asylum status here in the United States."); 135 CONG. REC. 26,924 (1989) (statement of Rep.
Hefley) ("This amendment is about.., human rights, not just forced abortion and sterilization. The
plain fact of the matter is that the U.S. Government should not be in the position of 'aiding and
abetting' the Chinese Government in its attempt to force the Chinese people to undergo mandatory
sterilization.").
151. 135 CONG. REC. 30,446 (1989) (statement of Sen. Kohl) ("This measure will
provide ... valuable protection for Chinese nationals fleeing that nation's coercive 'one couple, one
child' family planning policies.").
152. H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, pt. 1, at 174. Similar debates were occurring at the same time that
help shed light on Congress's intent to specifically support married couples. When discussing the
Immigration in the National Interest Act of 1995, Rep. Goodlatte stated: "Young married couples
with young children, they need to be able to come here more quickly .. " 142 CONG. REC. 5972
(1996). Additionally, when the Defense of Marriage Act was discussed in 1996, Sen. Coats
declared: "We must help married couples to stay together when times are difficult." 142 CONG. REC.
22,451 (1996).
153. See Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 560 (9th Cir. 2004). This hopelessly circular logic has
been described as:
[A] Catch-22. [Petitioner's] asylum claim is based on China's enforcement of its
population control policy, part of which includes a minimum age requirement for
marriages, and a minimum age for having children. The forcible abortion in this case
occurred precisely because [Petitioner] and his wife married and became pregnant prior
to those minimum ages. The marriage is not legal in China because of the population
control policy. Congress passed [section 601 (a)] to ensure that families who are victims
of forced abortion and sterilization under China's population control policy would
receive asylum, yet the IJ denied the claim precisely because that population control
policy rendered the marriage illegal. That would entirely subvert the Congressional
amendment ....Where a traditional marriage ceremony has taken place, but is not
recognized by the Chinese government because of the age restrictions in the population
control measures, that person nevertheless qualifies as a spouse for purposes of asylum.
Zhang v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 993, 999 (7th Cir. 2006).
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be eligible to receive asylum protection.
B. GrantingAsylum to Spouses Will Help Preserve the Family Unit
Affording asylum protection to spouses furthers another of
Congress's goals in passing the IIRIRA: preserving the family unit.
Family unification has historically been a priority for the United States,
55
as is evidenced by the INA' 51 4 and U.S. immigration policy. A review
of the number of immigrants entering the United States and the means by
which they secure residency will reveal a common conclusion: United
States immigration is oriented toward family. 5 6 The quota given to the
various means of acquiring residency immediately exposes family unity
as a main priority. 5 7 Notably, immediate relatives are completely
exempt from any quantitative limits.1 58 But more importantly, the
159
definition of "immediate relatives" includes spouses.
Section 601(a) currently provides asylum protection to direct
victims of persecution by China's coercive family planning policies, but
that protection remains incomplete if victims are afforded asylum
without their spouses. This is because the presence of a spouse facilitates
the integration process, allowing the victim to establish herself more
that family reunification
quickly in our society. 160 It has even been noted
6
1
dignity.
victim's
a
restore
to
way
only
the
is
The priority given to spouses protects and preserves the family as
154. U.S. Dep't of State, The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,
77
19.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/8
155. See, e.g., Perales v. Casillas, 903 F.2d 1043, 1046 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting that "one of the
central purposes of the immigration laws [is] family reunification"); Kaho v. lichert, 765 F.2d 877,
879 n.1 (9th Cir.1985) (commenting that one of the INA's basic objectives is to reunite families);
Lau v. Kiley, 563 F.2d 543, 545 (2d Cir. 1977) (noting that the Act's preference system was
"primarily designed to further the basic objective of reuniting families").
156. For a historical account of the emphasis upon family in U.S. immigration law, see John
Guendelsberger, Implementing Family Unification Rights in American Immigration Law: Proposed
Amendments, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 253, 255-62 (1988) and John Guendelsberger, The Right to
Family Unification in French and United States Immigration Law, 21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 7-25

(1988).
157. See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a)(1) (2006); see also STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION LAW
AND POLICY 14 (1992).

158. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i).
159. Id.
160. Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement, Geneva, Switz., June 20-21, 2001,
Background Note for the Agenda Item: Family Reunification in the Context of Resettlement and
Integration, 2, 10, available at http://www.unhcr.org/3b30baa04.html [hereinafter Family
Reunification].
161.

Lori A. Nessel, Forced to Choose: Torture, Family Reunification, and United States

ImmigrationPolicy, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 897, 926 (2005).
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the fundamental unit of society, restores basic dignity to the victim, and
provides protection for children.1 62 As articulated by the United Nations
High Commission for Refugees, "refugees and other persons in need of
international protection who have no other country than the country of
asylum or resettlement to lead a normal family life together should be
'63
entitled to family reunion in the country of asylum or resettlement."1
The Ninth Circuit recognized in Ma that the long-established principle of
keeping families together is an important part of the analysis of a
spouse's eligibility under the IIRIRA. 164 There, the court noted that
following the BIA's construction of section 601(a) in C-Y-Z-, which
excluded from asylum those prevented from marrying by China's
laws, would lead to "absurd results"--"the break-up
restrictive marriage1 65
of the family unit.
The unification of couples and families is often assumed to have a
beneficial effect on a refugee. 166 A reunited family helps a refugee
integrate into the adopted country more quickly.1 67 Family members are
often essential for healing refugees who were victims of persecution in
their home countries. 168 Moreover, they help stabilize the migrantwhich contributes to the reduction of crime169and tends to increase the
economic productivity of the asylum seeker.
Reuniting families also benefits the adopted country. Granting
asylum to spouses assures that less of the money earned in the adopted
country is sent back to the family still in the country of origin. 170 The
economic benefits of this are clear. The reunited family spends their
money and makes investments in their adopted country, which, in turn,
brings more money into the adopted country's economy. Therefore,
allowing a family to be reunified is not "a mere exercise of state
generosity but rather a crucial aspect of integrating and stabilizing
migrant populations.''

162. See Family Reunification,supra note 160, at 1.
163.
164.

Id.at 2.
See Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 561 (9th Cir. 2004).

165. Id
166. Nora V. Demleitner, How Much Do Western Democracies Value Family and Marriage?:
ImmigrationLaw's ConflictedAnswers, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV.273, 285 (2003).
167. See Family Reunification,supra note 160, at 2, 10.
168. Demleitner, supra note 166, at 294; see also Family Reunification,supranote 160, at 10.

169. Demleitner, supra note 166, at 285.
170.

See id. at 294-95 (citing Encourage Expats to Bring Their Families-GCC Study,

KERALA MONITOR, June 2, 2003, http://www.keralamonitor.com/expatsgulf.html).
171. Demleitner, supra note 166, at 286.
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IV. THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT
Section 601(a) should be amended to include both legally married
spouses and those spouses whose traditional marriages are not
recognized by the Chinese government because the couples did not meet
the strict age requirements of the family planning policies. 172 Extending
protection to legally married spouses is not particularly controversial.
Prior to Lin II, it was the only standard that had been universally
accepted by the circuit courts to have directly decided the issue. 173 It is
by the BIA. 17 4

also the position that had been consistently espoused
Conversely, none of the circuits to have adjudicated the issue of whether
to extend asylum protection to unmarried partners-such as boyfriends
176
17 5
or fiancs-chose to do so. Neither has the BIA.
With these two ends of the spectrum serving as a baseline, this Note
proposes an amendment that strikes a compromise. Admittedly, this is a
more conservative approach compared to ones that suggest the IIRIRA
be extended to include spouses and unmarried partners of direct victims
of China's coercive family planning policies. 177 This approach is

172. This is essentially the position taken by the courts in Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553 (9th
Cir. 2004) and Zhang v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 993 (7th Cir. 2006). See also supra Part II.B.3; supra
note 71 and accompanying text.
173. See, e.g., Yi Qiang Yang v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 494 F.3d 1311 (1lth Cir. 2007); Zhang v.
Gonzales, 434 F.3d 993 (7th Cir. 2006); Zhang v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 531 (5th Cir. 2004); Chen v.
Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2004); Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553 (9th Cir. 2004). Prior to the
Second Circuit's decision in Lin II, it too extended asylum protection to a married spouse under
section 601(a). See Zhang v. INS, 386 F.3d 66, 71-72 (2d Cir. 2004).
174. See In re S-L-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 4 (B.I.A. 2006) (reaffirming the rule set forth in In re
C-Y-Z-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 915 (B.I.A. 1997)).
175. See, e.g., Lian v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 228 Fed. App'x. 188, 193 (3d Cir. 2007) ("Boyfriends
of women subjected to involuntary abortions are not eligible for asylum."); Chen v. Gonzales, 457
F.3d 670, 674 (7th Cir. 2006) ("[N]o court yet has recognized an unmarried male partner... as a
'refugee' under § l101(a)(42)'s forced abortion and sterilization provisions"); Jiu Shu Wang v.
United States Att'y Gen., 152 Fed. App'x. 761, 767 (11 th Cir. 2005) (noting that asylum protection
based on "forced abortion or sterilization has not been imputed beyond a marital relationship");
Zhang v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 531, 532 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that a 'live-in' girlfriend" is not a
recognized relationship for purposes of extending asylum protection and noting that "merely
impregnating one's girlfriendis not alone an act of 'resistance"').
176. S-L-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 9 ("We do not find convincing reasons to extend the nexus and
level of harm attributed to a husband who was opposed to his wife's forced abortion to a boyfriend
or fianc&").
177. See, e.g., Dempsey, supra note 93, at 236-39 (criticizing the BIA's limiting of refugee
status to married couples); Raina Nortick, Note, Singled Out: A Proposal to Extend Asylum to the
Unmarried Partnersof Chinese Nationals Fleeing the One-Child Policy, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
2153, 2191 (2007) (recommending that the IIRIRA be amended to included unmarried partners).
Others have also concluded that a similar statutory amendment to the one suggested in this Note
should be enacted. See, e.g., Megan A. Carrick, Note, Ensuring That FederalCircuit Courts Adhere
to the Spirit of the Law: Why Legally and Non-Legally MarriedSpouses Deserve Explicit Asylum
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suggested for practical reasons, not ideological ones. While those
suggestions are certainly sympathetic and idealistic, they fail to account
for the practical difficulties in extending the IIRIRA to all those who are
harmed by coercive family planning policies. Further, since the goal is to
provide greater protection to those who have been persecuted, the
amendment proposed in this Note has a greater chance of actually being
adopted by Congress than a more idealistic one. This is because it is less
likely to meet the strong resistance or bureaucratic roadblocks a more
expansive amendment would encounter.' 78 Also, this solution is
particularly fitting as it comports with Congress's dual intent to protect
both individual victims and
couples who have been persecuted and to
79
unit.'
family
the
preserve
For these reasons, section 601(a) should be amended to include
these two types of spouses of direct victims. The specific language
would read:
For purposes of determinations under this Act, a person, or the married
spouse, or if unable to be married because of a coercive population
control program, then the spouse marriedin a traditionalor religious

ceremony, of a person, who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to
undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has been persecuted for
failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to
a coercive population control program, shall be deemed to have been
180
persecuted ....

Protection Under Section 601 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act,
42 CREIGHTON L. REv. 181, 222-23 (2009) (discussing the necessity of congressional involvement);
Heidi Murphy, Note, Sending the Men Over First: Amending Section 601(a) of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act to Allow Asylum for Spouses and Partners,
33 VT. L. REV. 143, 164 (2008) (commenting that amending section 601(a) to included both legally
and traditionally married spouses is the only way to provide "absolute protection"). However, none
of those that have addressed this issue-either to include all partners or only traditionally married
spouses-have specifically dealt with the statutory language such an amendment should include.
178. See George D. Brown, Counterrevolution?-NationalCriminalLaw After Raich, 66 OHIO
ST. L.J. 947, 967 (2005) ("The political difficulties that are obvious in trying to pass any such broad
statute inevitably lead toward attempts at the narrow one .... ").
179. See Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 559 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Congress's goal in passing
[section 601(a) was] to provide relief for 'couples' [who have been] persecuted on account of an
'unauthorized' pregnancy and to keep families together." (citing H.R. REP. No. 104-469 pt. 1, at 174
(1996))).
180. 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(42)(B) (2006). The language in italics constitutes the proposed
amendment. Furthermore, as this is a proposed amendment to a federal statute, the term "spouse"
must be interpreted according to the Defense of Marriage Act's definition of spouse. See infra notes
247-250 and accompanying text.
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V. OBSTACLES TO THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT

A. Allowing Anyone Other Than Direct Victims Increases the Chance of

Fraud
It has been said that "like spam, Chinese family planning cases are
almost never what they hold themselves out to be."' 81 This is particularly
true when "snakeheads 1 82 are involved in coaching asylum seekers,
whom they smuggle into the United States, to say they are victims of
coercive family planning programs. 83 Historically, the largest group of
Chinese immigrants has been men arriving alone. 184 In fact, from 1996 to
2001, approximately three quarters of those Chinese immigrants granted
asylum under section 601(a) were men.' 85 Moreover, ninety percent of
the Chinese applicants for asylum received by the Department of State
come from three counties in Fujian Province,1 86 where asylum 87seekers
are "coached in how to satisfy the US requirements for asylum."'1

In one particularly egregious case of fraud, an asylum seeker who
claimed he was persecuted because of China's one-child policy admitted

that he really came to the United States for economic reasons.1 88 Shortly
after his release, he joined a gang, extorted money from other Chinese
immigrants, and was subsequently sentenced to eleven years in U.S.
prison.1 89 Critics claim that the current IIRIRA "map[s] out for aliens
exactly how to obtain a grant of asylum .... ,,190 As the aforementioned
181. Matt Hayes, INS China Policy Opens Border to Asylum Scams, FOX NEWS, Feb. 5, 2004,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,110481,00.html; see also Yeh Ling-Ling, Op-Ed, Fake
Refugees Cite China's One-Child Rule, S.F. EXAM'R, Dec. 21, 1994, available at
http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/-matloff/pub/Immigration/AsyRef/YehChinaSFX.html
(reporting that
when the Chinese nationals being smuggled aboard were "asked in Chinese why they had come to
the United States [during the review of their asylum applications], the answer given matter-of-factly
by many of them was: 'To make money!').
182. A "snakehead" is a term to describe human smugglers who sneak tens of thousands of
Chinese into the United States each year, charging each stowaway up to $60,000. In order to receive
their payment in the United States from their passengers' relatives or friends, they need to ensure
that their charges make it successfully past immigration officials; therefore, they may instruct them
to claim falsely that they are fleeing persecution. See Kung, supranote 27, at 1274-75, 1306.
183. Id. at 1306.
184. Patricia Wen, Law Offers Chinese a Path to U.S.: Policy Giving Asylum to Those Facing
CoercedBirth Control Benefits Mostly Men, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 18, 2002, at B 1.
185. Id.
186. PROFILE OF ASYLUM CLAIMS, supra note 56, at 32.
187. INS: Enforcement, Asylum, and Naturalization, MIGRATION NEWS, Aug. 1996,
http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=1007_0_2_0.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Hayes, supra note 181. It has been reported that an actual asylum school has been formed
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case illustrates, there are already certain unsavory characters seeking to
fraudulently enter the United States under the guise of being victimized
by China's one-child policy. It could be said that expanding the IIRIRA
to officially include other men, even if they are spouses, has the potential
of attracting even more of these individuals and their fraudulent claims.
This kind of speculation, however, does not recognize that there
are, in fact, safeguards in place to root out fraudulent claims. The REAL
ID Act of 2005191 modified the asylum laws to allow Js to require
asylum seekers to provide more corroboration of their asylum
applications. This also made it easier for IJs to find asylum seekers not
credible by allowing even slight discrepancies to support an adverse
credibility determination. 192 The IJ evaluates the asylum seeker's
credibility based on "the totality of the circumstances" and "all relevant
factors."'193 The following factors are used to consider the credibility of
the asylum seeker's claim:
demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or witness, the
inherent plausibility of the applicant's or witness's account, the
consistency between the applicant's or witness's written and oral
statements (whenever made and whether or not under oath, and
considering the circumstances under which the statements were made),
the internal consistency of each such statement, the consistency of such
statements with other evidence of record (including the reports of the
Department of State on country conditions), and any inaccuracies or
falsehoods in such statements, without regard to whether an
inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes
94 to the heart of the
applicant's claim, or any other relevant factor. 1

in the language and training institutes of San Diego, California, which take money from Chinese
nationals in exchange for training them for a successful family planning case. Id. These schools
allegedly provide a would-be refugee with a textbook and instructions in the basics of a family
planning case, as well as fake documents indicating the applicant was previously arrested for
fighting with Chinese authorities attempting to perform a forced abortion on his spouse. Id.
191. See REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, §§ 101(a)(iii) & 101(b)(2), 119 Stat. 231
(2005) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2006)).

192.

8 U.S.C. § 1158 (b)(1)(B)(iii).

193. Id.
194. Id. Adverse credibility findings may also be based on fraudulent documents. See In re 0D-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 1079, 1083 (B.IA. 1998) ("The presentation of fraudulent documents is a
critical factor in our analysis ....Such fraud tarnishes the [asylum seeker's] veracity and
diminishes the reliability of his other evidence."). Before the REAL ID Act, "[m]inor
inconsistencies ... that [did] not relate to the basis of an applicant's alleged fear of persecution, [or]
go to the heart of the asylum claim [did] not generally support an adverse credibility finding." Singh
v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 1100, 1105 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted) (third alteration in original).
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Furthermore, the REAL ID Act makes the determination of
credibility more significant and even more difficult to challenge on
appeal. It allows IJs to make adverse credibility determinations "without
regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the
heart of the application's claim." 195 In her concurring opinion in In re SM-J-,196 Board Member Rosenberg noted the important point that asylum
adjudicators "should avoid any predisposition against believing the
applicant" for his or her inability to obtain supporting documents, further
stating that "presum[ing] an individual to be a liar rather than a truth
not
only
[the]
duty
to
be
impartial,
teller... violate[s]
which
regulations
and
the1' 97 statute
but ...abrogate[s]
govern ...adjudications."
In addition, the fact that others, unrelated to a particular asylum
seeker, have committed fraud in the past has nothing to do with that
asylum seeker's claims. Asylum seekers have a due process right to an
individualized assessment of their applications. 98 While the United
States government does have a valid concern about fraud in asylum
cases, that concern does not permit IJs to weigh generalized information
about fraudulent claims more heavily than the evidence the asylum
seeker has submitted in the case. 199

For example, asylum claims of individuals originating from the
Fujian Province in China are commonly found to provide prejudicial,
ambiguous, and unreliable information. 200 As was mentioned above,
"[n]inety percent of asylum claims received by the Department of State
come from the Fujian province. 20 ' The 1998 Profile of Asylum Claims
lists a number of elements commonly found in claims from Fujianese.2 °2
195. Chain v. Attorney General of U.S., 445 F.3d 683, 692 n.10 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing REAL
ID Act of 2005 § 101).
196. 21 1. & N. 722 (B.I.A. 1997).
197. Id. at 739.
198. Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Llana-Castellov v. INS,
163 F.3d 1093, 1096 (10th Cir. 1994)).
199. See Tian-Yong Chen v. INS, 359 F.3d 121, 130 (2d Cir. 2004) (warning against
"excessive reliance" on a country conditions report's qualified description of general practices and
noting that such "observations do not automatically discredit contrary evidence presented by the
applicant"); see also Ren v. Gonzales, 164 Fed. App'x. 33, 35 n.3 (2d Cir. 2006) ("While the
[reports of fraud from certain regions] may diminish the weight afforded to the [abortion] certificate,
it is insufficient to reject the evidence outright, or to find the petitioner generally not credible ... .
200. See PROFILE OF ASYLUM CLAIMS, supra note 56, at 33.

201. Seeid.at32.
202. Id. at 32. Some of the elements common in Fujianese claims include: (a) a wife being so
ill that she could not undergo sterilization, so the husband was chosen to have the procedure; (b) that
an applicant got into a physical fight with aggressive birth control officials (a claim frequently
arising in applications by young unmarried applicants); or (c) that fanatical birth control officials
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Yet a claim based on any of these elements should not be suspect solely
by the virtue of being on that list. This list could just as easily support an
authentic asylum
claim because all of the elements have been confirmed
2 3
as possibilities.

0

Additionally, the 1998 Profile of Asylum Claims raises the question
of authenticity and veracity as the "[d]ocumentation from China. . . is
subject to widespread fabrication and fraud. 2 °4 However, it also
contains other useful information that can help IJs to identify fraudulent
testimony or documents. For example, the false information may be that
a particular province only issues one-child certificates and not other
documents, or that a particular type of document was only issued up to a
certain date.20 5
A critique of extending asylum protection beyond the claims of
direct victims is that many men will fabricate stories to qualify under the
amendment.20 6 This argument lacks merit because people who are
willing to lie in order to receive asylum would change their story to fit
whatever laws are in place to regulate asylum. 20 7 "The solution to
credibility problems is careful case-by-case adjudication, not wholesale
denial., 20 8 The exact same credibility rules that apply to other asylum
cases should apply to these cases.20 9 In Chen, the court implied that the
BIA would have to engage in a "detailed (and probably inconclusive)
psychological analysis concerning the nature of a claimed relationship"
if it stopped requiring legal marriage certificates from asylum seekers.210
But simply producing a piece of paper does not make an asylum seeker's
claim credible. 21' Furthermore, skeptics should note the extremely high
standard of proof required in asylum cases. The Second Circuit has even
criticized the BIA's standard of proof as being so high that it "enable[s]
the administrative decisionmaker to reject whichever applicants that facttried to impose fines claimed to be so high that the applicant and his family were unable to pay. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id at 33.
205. Id.at 28.
206. See 142 CONG. REC. 5969 (Mar. 21, 1996) (statement of Rep. Smith).
207. Id.
208. Id.

209. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, pt. 1, at 174 (1996) ("Nothing in [the IIRIRA] is intended to
lower the evidentiary burden of proof... no matter how serious the nature of the claim ....[T]he
burden of proof remains on the applicant, as in every other case, to establish by credible evidence
that he or she has been subject to persecution ....
").
210.

See Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 229 (3d Cir. 2004).

211. For an argument that all asylum applicants should be presumed credible based on a
narrative recitation of the persecution they have suffered, see generally Ilene Durst, Lost in
Translation: Why Due Process Demands Deference to the Refugee's Narrative, 53 RUTGERS L.
REV. 127 (2000).
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finder happen[s] to disfavor., 2 12 The Court argued that a "legal standard
that empowers an [IJ] or the BIA to rule against a petitioner who fails to
anticipate the particular set of details that the fact-finder desires ... is no
standard at all. 2 13 Instead, the court noted, it was sufficient for IJs
concerned about the credibility of an asylum applicant, "to pose
questions aimed at eliciting inconsistent or inherently implausible
statements. ,,214 Yet, even with the harsh criticisms 215in Qiu, the BIA
currently retains a severely elevated standard of proof.
Reportedly high fraud rates from a particular region or certain
common elements in fraudulent claims should not constitute sufficient
evidence to support the denial of asylum, especially when those same
regions and claims support legitimate asylum claims. Moreover, with
stricter corroboration requirements, as well as an asylum seeker's
credibility and the document's authenticity already being suspect, it is
very challenging for would-be refugees to support their asylum
applications.
As such, the concern about an increase in the amount of fraudulent
claims should the IIRIRA be expanded to protect both direct victims and
their spouses is unjustified. Courts should undertake individualized
findings of fact about the closeness of relationship and the actual harm
suffered by the applicants when making asylum rulings. An asylum
seeker who credibly demonstrates he has experienced harm rising to the
level of persecution when a partner underwent forced abortion or
sterilization is entitled to the protection of the IIRIRA.
B. Extending Asylum ProtectionBeyond Direct Victims
Would Open the ProverbialFloodgates
Before the IIRIRA was passed, many expressed concern that a
flood of refugees would result from granting asylum based on forced
216
abortions and sterilizations. While this concern is closely related to the
aforementioned concern over an increase in fraudulent asylum claims, it
is worth briefly addressing on its own. Simply put, the flood has not

212. Qiu v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 140, 151-52 (2d Cir. 2003).
213. Id. at 151.
214. Id. at 152 n.6.
215. See, e.g., Zhang v. INS, 386 F.3d 66,67 (2d Cir. 2004). In a case where the authenticity of
the petitioner's sterilization certificate and receipt for payment of a family planning penalty is not
challenged, the BIA still found the documentary and testimonial evidence insufficient. See id. at 86.
216. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REc. S4592 (daily ed. May 2, 1996) (statement of Sen. Simpson)
("[I]f this amendment.., were to come to pass... I suggest that there will be millions of people
who, under this language, will qualify.").
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come to pass and will not be an issue if section 601(a) is extended to
legally and traditionally married couples because the number of refugees
granted asylum is capped annually. 17 Indeed, eight years after the
IIRIRA was passed, the waiting list for asylum protection based on
China's one-child policy consisted of a paltry seven thousand
applicants.2 18 The few thousand extra refugees that may be granted
asylum is a mere fraction compared to the one million legal and illegal
immigrants that arrive in the United States each year.2 19
The fear of a flood of asylum seekers is particularly unfounded
because, barring a limited number of circumstances, the person must be
present in the United States to petition for asylum.220 Therefore, granting
asylum to the spouses of direct victims will not create any extra
incentive because extending the scope of the IIRIRA will not make it
any easier for a person to actually get into the United States to begin
with.22'
217. Every year the President sets a limit on the number of refugees that will be admitted. See
NANCY F. RYTINA, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., ANNUAL FLOW REPORT, REFUGEE APPLICANTS
AND ADMISSIONS TO THE UNITED STATES: 2004, at 1 (2005), available at http://www.dhs.gov/

xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/refugeeflowreport2004.pdf. In 2004, the maximum number to
be admitted was 70,000. Id. This number has not increased. Compare id ("For 2004, as in 2002 and
2003, the final authorized ceiling was 70,000.") with U.S. DEP'T OF STATE ET AL., PROPOSED
REFUGEE ADMISSIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008: REPORT TO CONGRESS, at iv (2007), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/91978.pdf (reporting that the President's budget
proposal for 2008 requested funding for 70,000 refugees and asylum seekers). In 2008, the United
States granted asylum to approximately 20,500 individuals and resettled close to 60,200 refugees
from other countries. U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES & IMMIGRANTS, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY

2009-UNITED STATES (2009), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a40d2b580.html. Not only is
there not a flood of refugees, but there are not even enough would-be refugees to reach the 70,000
person cap.
218. In 2003, roughly 14,000 Chinese refugees applied for asylum; approximately 7000 of
those refugees based their application on persecution due to China's coercive population control
measures. See Michelle Chen, Leaving One-Child Behind: Chinese Immigrants Seek Asylum in
America from China's One-Child Policy, LEGAL AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2005, at 8, 9, available at
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/November-December-2005/scene-chen_novdec5.msp; see also
Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 225 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing News Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
EOIR Notifies Persons Eligible for Full Asylum Benefits for Fiscal Year 2003 Based on Coercive
Population Control Policies (Sept. 30, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/03/
CPCAsylumRelease09O3.pfd).
219. Every year, approximately 800,000 illegal immigrants cross into the United States.
Roughly half of those do not remain here due to deportations, death, and voluntary departures. See
Mark Krikorian, Not Amnesty But Attrition: The Way to Go on Immigration, NAT 'LREV., Mar. 22,
2004, at 38. The United States accepts "roughly a million legal immigrants and half-a-million
illegals each year." Mark Steyn, Illegals the Political "Untouchables", CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Jan.
11, 2004, at A39.
220. 8 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2006).
221. See 142 CONG. REC. 10,047 (1996) (statement of Rep. Smith). (explaining that each
applicant is still required to prove his or her case).
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C. If Section 601(a) Is To Be ExtendedAt All, It Should Only Be
Extended To Legally MarriedSpouses
This objection to extending asylum protection to traditionally
married spouses is much more tempting than those previously
mentioned.222 As was mentioned above, it was the only standard to have
been universally accepted by the circuit courts and the BIA.22 3 The BIA
has stated that the marriage requirement "is a practical and manageable
approach which takes into account the language and purpose of the
224
statutory definition in light of the general principles of asylum law."
Because of the strong desire to have administrative feasibility and
uniformity in U.S. immigration law,22 5 extending section 601(a) to
married spouses may only resonate with Congress and the Supreme
Court.
But despite this strong desire, mere administrative or judicial
convenience should not outweigh Congress's intent to protect other
victims of China's coercive family planning programs.2 26 Furthermore,
only extending per se asylum protection to married spouses would go
against Congress's goal of preserving the family unit.22 7 The definition
of a family in the United States has changed considerably over the past
forty years.228 It should no longer be assumed that a family only includes
a legally married mother and father. In fact, the departure from the
traditional, nuclear family has become progressively more accepted in
the United States.229 While some courts continue to deny parental rights

222. See supra Part V.A-B.
223. See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
224. In re S-L-L-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 1, 9 (B.I.A. 2006).
225. Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice (Lin 11),
494 F.3d 296, 316 n.2 (2d Cir. 2007)
(Katzman, J., concurring) (stating that "'it would be unsound for each of the several Courts of
Appeals to elaborate a potentially nonuniform body of law' and describing uniformity as 'especially
desirable in cases such as these' (quoting Jian Hui Shao v. BIA, 465 F.3d 497, 502 (2d Cir.
2006))).
226. See supra Part III.A.
227. See supra Part II.B.
228. In 1968, eighty-five percent of children lived in households where the parents were
married and living under one roof. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, LIVING ARRANGEMENTS OF
CHILDREN UNDER 18 YEARS OLD: 1960 TO PRESENT 1-2 tbl.CH-l (2006), available at
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fanchl.pdf. In 1978, that number decreased to
seventy-eight percent, and in 1988 the number decreased again to seventy-three percent. Id. By
2005, only sixty-seven percent of children lived in households where the parents were married and
living under one roof. Id.
229. See More Firms Covering Domestic Partners, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 21, 2001, at G2
(reporting that many companies are changing the coverage of their health plans to include unmarried
couples).
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and family status to non-nuclear families, 230 other courts have begun to
recognize the notion of "functional families."2 3'
The notion of dedication, caring, and self-sacrifice in functional
families-championed by Braschi v. Stahl Associates232 in what was
effectively a common law marriage-has been completely ignored by
the BIA. In restricting the presumption of persecution to couples who are
"actually committed to a marital relationship, ' 233 the BIA neglected to
take into account those couples who are committed to a marital
relationship but cannot obtain an officially legal marriage because of
Chinese family planning policies. Admittedly, this precise issue was not
before the BIA in S-L-L-.234 The case does, however, imply that the
concern is not with the intent of the relationship, but rather with whether
the relationship conformed to legal standards.23 5 Moreover, this
reasoning leaves a gap in the law and is simply out of touch with the
modern world.23 6 The United States recognizes functional families, not
230. See Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991) (denying visitation rights to
former same-sex partner because she was neither the child's adoptive nor biological parent).
231. The seminal case adopting a functional definition of the family was Braschi v. Stahl
Assocs., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989). There, the New York Court of Appeals found that a same-sex
couple, living together as life partners for more than ten years, should be regarded as a "family" for
purposes of New York's rent control statute. Id. at 55. The court refused to allow a strict definition
of "family" to defeat the protective purpose of the New York rent control system as a whole. See id.
at 54. Instead, it noted that the term family "should not be rigidly restricted to those people who
have formalized their relationship by obtaining, for instance, a marriage certificate or an adoption
order." Id. at 53. The court concluded that an objective examination of the parties' relationship-based upon the "totality of the relationship as evidenced by the dedication, caring and self-sacrifice
of the parties"-should control. Id. at 55. For further cases adopting a functional definition of
family, see In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995) (holding that visitation of
a non-biological parent could be in the best interests of a child, if there is a "parent-like relationship
with the child and ...a significant triggering event [that] justifies state intervention in the child's
relationship with a biological or adoptive parent"); see also E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 888
(Mass. 1999) (granting visitation rights to same-sex partner who was a de facto parent); T.B. v.
L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913, 914 (Pa. 2001) (holding that former same-sex partner could sue for visitation
rights by standing in loco parentis).
232. 543 N.E.2d at 55.
233. See In re S-L-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 12 (B.I.A. 2006).
234. Id. at 9 (determining whether section 601(a) should be extended to legally married spouses
and whether it should be extended boyfriends, fiancres, or unmarried partners). The BIA, however,
did not reach the issue of whether it should be extended to traditionally married spouses. See id.
at 4
n.3 ("No issue was raised ...regarding the legality of the marriage.").
235. ld. at 12.
236. See e.g., Katherine K. Baker, Bargainingor Biology? The History and Future of Paternity
Law and ParentalStatus, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 9-22 (2004) (discussing the modem
recognition of parental rights of biological fathers, nonbiological fathers, married, and unmarried
men); see also David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition: Tensions Between Legal,
Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 125 (Supp. 2006)
("Unwed fathers. . . are no longer categorically disregarded by the law.").
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just legal ones.237 Parents are equally persecuted partners because they
commit to a familial relationship, not because their relationship is
sanctioned by the state.
D. Amending Section 601(a) Has ImplicationsBeyond Asylum Law
A spouse's eligibility for asylum under section 601(a) raises two
hotly debated issues: the definition of marriage and U.S. immigration
policy. The very fact that even attempting to address the prospect of
spousal eligibility raises these issues may itself be the biggest obstacle to
remedying it. The elephant in the room, so to speak, is that both the
Supreme Court and Congress have nothing to gain-and alternatively,
much to lose-by weighing in.
1. The Definition of Marriage
With the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari to the applicants in
Lin //238 and Yi Qiang Yang v. Mukasey, 239 it appears that the Court is
unwilling to settle the dispute over whom, if anyone other than direct
victims, should be eligible for asylum under section 601(a). It seems
likely that the Court views the issue presented by Ma, Chen, and Lin II
as a political question,24 ° finding it better to employ the "technique[] of
,,241
'not doing' . . . [by] disposing of a case while avoiding judgment.
As has been noted,
[w]hen the Court is deciding a question of constitutional law or
international law (and, to a somewhat lesser degree, when it is
interpreting a statute), its decisions have an importance and an impact
which go far beyond a mere determination of the rights and duties of

237. This definition of family underlies arguments in favor of same-sex marriage, assisted
reproduction, and same-sex or single parent adoption. See generally Richard F. Storrow, Rescuing
Children from the Marriage Movement: The Case Against Marital Status Discrimination in
Adoption and Assisted Reproduction, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 305 (2006) (arguing that
discrimination against same-sex couples in matters of legal parenthood undermines legal traditions
and values and hurts the welfare of children).
238. Zhen Hua Dong v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 494 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied 128 S.
Ct. 2472 (2008).
239. Yi Qiang Yang v. Mukasey, 494 F.3d 1311 (llth Cir. 2007), cert. denied 128 S. Ct. 2466
(2008).

240. For more thorough discussions of the political question doctrine, see ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 183-98
(2d ed. Yale Univ. Press 1986) (1962); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 143-49 (3d
ed. 1999); LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 15-30 (1958); Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political

Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 601-06 (1976).
241.

BICKEL, supranote 240, at 169.
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the litigants in the instant case.242
In the wake of both the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v.
Texas 243 and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts's ruling in
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,244 the question of same-sex
marriage has fueled unending cultural debate, influenced political
campaigns, emboldened citizens to engage in civil disobedience, and led

to calls for state and federal legislators to amend their constitutions.24 5
With the sharp divisions surrounding the issue of same-sex marriage and

the Court's reluctance to address it, 246 it may be that both the Court and
Congress want to avoid making any decision dealing with the definition
of marriage or spouse.
However, as the IIRIRA is a federal law, and the proposed
amendment would include the words "marriage" and "spouse, 2 47 the
Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA") 248 would be implicated. Under
DOMA, "the word 'marriage' means only a legal union between one
man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers
only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.

249

For

better or worse, this controversial language is quite clear and remains
constitutional ten years after its passage. 5 0 Consequently, if Congress
granted asylum to the spouses of victims of coercive family planning
policies it would not have to address the definition of marriage or spouse
at all. It has already done so with DOMA. Should the definition of
242. Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the PoliticalQuestion: A FunctionalAnalysis, 75
YALE L.J. 517, 523 (1966).
243. See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding that a Texas law
prohibiting homosexual sodomy was unconstitutional).
244. See generally Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003)
(holding that a Massachusetts licensing statute that prohibited same-sex couples from marrying
violated the Massachusetts Constitution).
245. See William Raspberry, Reasons for Marriage, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 2004, at A21
(noting that "gay and lesbian couples lining up for marriage licenses" are "all over the news").
246. See generally Cynthia M. Davis, Comment, "The Great Divorce" of Government and
Marriage: Changing the Nature of the Gay Marriage Debate, 89 MARQ. L. REv. 795, 797-801
(2006) (characterizing same-sex marriage as a political question).
247. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
248. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 7, 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) (codified
at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)).
249. 1 U.S.C. § 7.
250. See Smelt v. County of Orange, 447 F.3d 673, 686 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S.
959 (2006) (affirming the district court's finding that the couple challenging DOMA's
constitutionality lacked standing); Gilmore v. Sec'y of the Dep't. of Children & Family Servs., 358
F.3d 804, 819-20 (11th Cir. 2004) (upholding the constitutionality of DOMA under a rational basis
standard of review); In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 132 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004) (stating that
DOMA did not violate the Tenth Amendment because "the definition of marriage... is not binding
on states and, therefore, there is no infringement on state sovereignty").
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marriage or spouse change, the proposed amendment's effect would
remain unchanged. It would still cover the spouses-however the term is
defined-of victims of population control programs.
2. U.S. Immigration Policy
Congress's reluctance to address the problem with the current
version of section 601(a) is further complicated when it is connected
25
with the highly charged issue of immigration into the United States. '
Congress has been unable to enact any comprehensive immigration
reform.252 Furthermore, the Senate's reluctance to pass anything at all to
fix the immigration system is evidenced by the failure of the
Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act (the
"DREAM Act"). 5 3 The current economic crisis, national security, and
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are taking priority on the domestic
agenda. As a result, there is little support left for enacting any
immigration reform.
But the pitfalls surrounding the immigration issue raised here can
be avoided as well. The proposed amendment is not a part of some
comprehensive immigration reform, nor is it the appropriate place for
scoring points on issues in current domestic politics. Rather, it is a
narrowly focused piece of legislation intended to clarify a specific aspect
of the IIRIRA. As such, the concerns that usually surround immigration
reform would not be implicated. The proposed amendment may help
reduce a major problem: illegal immigration.
Granting refugee status to legally and traditionally married spouses
may help decrease illegal immigration by allowing for a more
individualized investigation into the authenticity of family relationships.
Frequently, after a refugee has secured asylum, an attempt-whether
legally or illegally-will be made to reunite with their families.254 Since
251. For examples of the issues surrounding immigration reform, see Ediberto Romdn, The
Alien Invasion?,45 HOUS. L. REV. 841, 843-45 (2008) (discussing the issues surrounding the "mass
invasion" of illegal immigrants) and Patricia Smith, The Great Immigration Debate, N.Y. TIMES
UPFRONT, May 8, 2006, at 8, 8-9 (discussing the two common approaches to fixing the immigration
system-the 700-mile fence along the southern border of the United States and the guest-worker
program).
252. See, e.g., Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong. (2006).
Although the Bill ultimately failed in the Senate, some of its less contentious pieces have resurfaced
as Congress attempts to deal with concerns of illegal immigration and national security. See Julia
Preston, In Increments, Senate Revisits Immigration Bill: Provisionsfor Students and Farmworkers,

N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2007, at Al.
253. See Preston, supra note 252. For a fuller discussion of the DREAM Act, see Hiroshi
Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2037, 2087-90 (2008).
254. See Demleitner, supranote 166, at 295.
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asylum seekers have an incentive to migrate to where they already have
a social network of friends and family, 255 illegal immigration may
increase as authentic families are not able to unify through legal means.
Conversely, more families would likely be lawfully unified through the
proposed amendment. Additionally, the proposed amendment will
prevent, or at least decrease, the illegal immigration of the spouses of the
direct victim of coercive family planning programs, who are unable to
obtain asylum protection under the current legislation.
VI. CONCLUSION

The United States recognizes that China's one-child policy is a
brutal violation of a couple's human rights. In response, the IIRIRA, and
subsequently section 601(a), were passed to protect those persecuted by
the policy. But the BIA's latest interpretation of section 601(a) does not
protect those asylum seekers prevented from getting married in China by
the very family planning policies from which the statute is intended to
provide relief. Since Chinese laws permit only legally married people to
have children, traditionally married couples who seek to have a child are
at the greatest risk of being persecuted. Amending the IIRIRA to extend
per se refugee status and asylum protection to these spouses fleeing
China's one-child policy is appropriate as it is in line with Congress's
dual intent to protect the persecuted and preserve the family unit. This is
not just an immigration issue; it is a human rights issue. Thus, the United
States should reaffirm its commitment to protecting both direct victims
of persecution and their spouses, and open the "golden door" for them.
Sean T. Masson*

255. See Caroline B. Brettell, Theorizing Migration in Anthropology: The Social Construction
of Networks, Identities, Communitites, and Globaiscapes, in MIGRATION THEORY: TALKING ACROSS

DISCIPLINES 107 (Caroline B. Brettell & James F. Follifield eds., 2000); Monique Lee Hawthorne,
Comment, Family Unity in Immigration Law: Broadening the Scope of "Family," 11 LEWIS &

CLARK L. REV. 809, 811 (2007) (arguing that "the scope of the word 'family' as used in our
immigration policy should be changed to include different culturally relevant models of 'family').
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